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I. INTRODUCTION 
Faced with the very substantial threat of terrorist attack, the United States 
government, as well as the governments of other liberal democracies, has an obligation to 
protect its citizens and neutralize those who menace them.  Not all government actions   
to accomplish this goal will be unanimously welcomed by citizens.  As Michael Ignatieff 
notes, “Citizens are bound to disagree about how far the government is entitled to go in 
any given emergency.”1  Since 9/11, debate has arisen in this country over many of the 
provisions of the Patriot Act, indefinite detentions and treatment of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay, and the trial of prisoners by military tribunal, among other actions 
taken by the government.  These debates provoke the question, what actions were taken 
by other states in the past to successfully combat terrorism?  The fact that certain steps 
taken by other states contributed to a successful counterterrorism campaign may or may 
not justify those actions from a moral perspective; however, knowledge of those steps 
may lead to a greater understanding of what actions are desirable, necessary, or simply 
unavoidable.  Having such understanding is needed to plan policies, strategies, and tactics 
that are effective and acceptable to citizens as well as to the international community. 
This document reviews the histories of the successful counterterrorism efforts of 
two governments and attempts to draw lessons for the United States from their actions.  
In the belief that the lessons of history transcend the times in which the events occurred, 
the thesis investigates one group from the late twentieth century, the Sikh terrorists in 
Punjab, and one from the early nineteenth century, the Thugs in British colonial India.  It 
examines the nature of these two groups, as well as the actions by their state adversaries 
to contribute to their defeat.  The thesis emphasizes how measures to defeat terrorism 
affected civil liberties and human rights.  It examines only one factor in the decline of 
terrorism – government response.2  The causes of terrorism in these cases will not be 
examined in detail.   
 
1 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3. 
2 Martha Crenshaw argues that the decline of terrorism is “related to the interplay of three factors: the 
government response to terrorism (which is not restricted to preemption or deterrence), the strategic choices 
of the terrorist organization, and its organizational resources.”  Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism 
Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3 (Spring 1991), 80.   
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When human rights and civil liberties are discussed here, they will be considered 
from an early twenty-first century, United States’ perspective, since the purpose of the 
thesis is to draw lessons applicable to the United States.  Obviously, such a perspective 
did not exist at the times and places of these events.  Civil liberties are considered here to 
be those rights embodied in the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, 
otherwise known as the Bill of Rights, and in particular freedom of speech, freedom of 
the press, freedom of assembly, free exercise of religion, the right to privacy and security 
of the home and personal property, protection from unreasonable searches and seizures 
which requires specific warrants based on probable cause, the right to due process of law, 
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, the right to confront hostile 
witnesses and to call witnesses, the right to legal counsel, and protection from cruel and 
unusual punishments.  There are also other, more basic rights that the United States 
acknowledges which are not included in the Bill of Rights.  Although the United Nations' 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 lists a number of rights in common with the 
U.S. Bill of Rights, an artificial distinction will be made here:  Human rights will be 
defined as including the more basic of the rights listed in the UN articles and 
acknowledged by the United States but not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights, 
namely, the rights to life, liberty, and security, the right to recognition as a person before 
the law, the right not to be subject to torture, and the right to marry and found a family – 
a right whose significance will become apparent.4 
There is no intent to either condone or condemn the actions taken by the 
governments in these histories.  Both governments were faced with the monumental 
challenge of responding to direct threats to social order and safety from large organized 
groups of individuals deeply enmeshed within the very states they threatened.  The 
 
3 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1997), http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm, accessed 19 July 2005. 
4 The United States, as part of the U.N. General Assembly, voted for the adoption of the Declaration 
on Human Rights on 10 December, 1948.  John Keaton, “Human Rights Declaration Adopted by U.N. 
Assembly,” The New York Times, 11 December, 1948, 1. Article 5 of the UN declaration states, “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Amendment VIII to the 
U.S. Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel an 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  To create an artificial and highly debatable distinction, physical torture 
will be considered a violation of human rights; other forms of cruel, excessive, or degrading punishment 
will be considered violations of civil liberties.  The rationale being that yet another line is crossed when 
physical abuse of prisoners or suspects begins. 
3 
actions were deemed necessary by those charged with meeting the challenge.  A moral 
critique will not be attempted here.  However, since this thesis examines how civil 
liberties and human rights were affected by these counterterrorism campaigns, 
accusations and allegations of violations of the rights and liberties recognized in the 
present-day United States, if deemed credible, will be noted, as will any government 
actions that would be considered civil liberties or human rights violations if they took 
place in the United States today. 
This thesis draws several lessons from these successful counterterrorism 
campaigns that may be important to the United States’ own counterterrorism efforts.  
First, a number of tactics common to both efforts were used successfully in combating 
terrorism.  These include targeting leaders of smaller groups when no unified hierarchal 
command structure exists, and the use of informants.  Second, both governments 
curtailed civil liberties as part of their counterterrorism strategies.  In both cases, those 
involved gave this move major credit for the success of their efforts against the terrorists.  
In conjunction with this, human rights violations can occur and at times may be 
considered to be a necessary tactic.  Lastly, as a first step in planning for response to 
terrorist attack and considering the possible effect on civil liberties, the United States 
must accept that, historically, successful terrorist attacks lead to curtailment of civil 
liberties. By understanding that civil liberties will be curtailed following a successful 
attack, the U.S. can take steps to mitigate any possible damage to the ideals and morals of 
the nation.  
This thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter I presents the thesis, describes the 
context in which civil liberties are considered, and briefly presents the lessons gleaned 
from these histories that may be applicable to the United States’ counterterrorism efforts.  
Chapter II provides a brief introduction to the two successful counterterrorism campaigns 
examined and the terrorist groups involved.  It describes the reasons for examining these 
particular events.  Chapter III examines the history of the Thug campaign conducted by 
the colonial British in the early 1800s.  Chapter IV examines the history of the 
counterterrorism efforts of the Indian government and the state of Punjab against Sikh 
terrorist groups in the 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter V describes the common elements in the 
4 
successful Sikh and Thug campaigns.  Chapter VI describes lessons derived from these 
two successful counterterrorism campaigns applicable to the United States’ 
counterterrorism efforts. 
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II. TWO SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERRORISM CAMPAIGNS 
This thesis examines counterterrorism campaigns that took place approximately 
one hundred and fifty years apart, the campaign against the Thugs [1829-1835] and the 
campaign against the Sikhs [1980-1993]. Their selection is based on the belief that many 
of the tactics and strategies in those campaigns, and particularly those regarding the 
curtailment of civil liberties, transcend the decades and are relevant to the United States' 
current counterterrorism efforts.  The primary reason for focusing on these particular 
campaigns, however, is that both successfully defeated the terrorist groups, and the 
success in each case is credited primarily to state actions.  The demise of every now-
defunct terrorist group cannot be credited to the state.  Crenshaw notes that “terrorism 
may be abandoned because it has accomplished its purpose,” “because its costs increase 
and/or its benefits decline,” or because of the “availability of new options.”5  To examine 
the history of a successful terrorist group would not reveal which actions a modern-day 
government might find useful in combating terrorism.6  To examine a terrorist group 
whose demise did not result primarily from government actions is outside the scope of 
this thesis.7  Both counterterrorism campaigns examined here were successful, targeted 
efforts against groups that had operated with near impunity in their areas of influence.8   
The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) 
Terrorism Knowledge Base defines a terrorist group as: 
A collection of individuals belonging to an autonomous non-state or sub 
national revolutionary or anti-governmental movement who are dedicated 
to the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Such an entity is seen as 
having at least some structural and command and control apparatus that, 
 
5Martha Crenshaw, “Why Violence Is Rejected or Renounced: A Case Study of Oppositional 
Terrorism,” in A Natural History of Peace, ed. Thomas Gregor, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1996), 259-268. 
6 The Irgun in British controlled Palestine in the late 1940s is an example. 
7 The Abu Nidal Organization, for example. 
8While Crenshaw (“Why Violence Is Rejected” 259, 263) notes, “organizational and psychological 
interpretations of terrorist behavior imply that terrorism is rarely abandoned as long as the organization 
using it continues to exist,” she goes on to state that “governmental response may contribute to the internal 
costs of terrorism by provoking organizational disintegration, involving the breakdown of incentives that 
the leadership of an organization can offer followers and the dissolution of the psychological bonds that 
promote solidarity and help provide moral justification for terrorism.  Government arrests or assaults may 
deprive an organization of key leaders who are irreplaceable.” 
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no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an overall 
organizational framework and general strategic direction. This definition 
is meant to include contemporary religion-motivated and apocalyptic 
groups and other movements that seek theological justification or divine 
sanction for their acts of violence.9 
The Thugs were not a unified organization.  They were a group of autonomous 
gangs united by a belief in a common deity and a means of worship that included human 
sacrifice.  While the Thug gangs usually operated independently, when desired they could 
combine for a major operation.  They were unlike many modern terrorist groups in their 
desire to keep their activities hidden.  The Thugs had a major effect on commerce and 
travel in the area where they operated.  The Sikh terrorists, while actually a number of 
different organizations, will be considered as one group.  They are generally tied to the 
movement in the state of Punjab to gain independence from India, a movement which 
often included killing Hindu citizens or attempting to drive them from the region.  As 
originally conceptualized, this independent state was to be fundamentalist Sikh in nature.  
Eventually many of these organizations fell prey to a common terrorist blunder and began 
targeting their natural support group – in this case, other Sikhs.10 Over time, many of 
these groups degenerated into little more than criminal organizations, operating for power 
and profit.  At the peak of their power, most of the state of Punjab was living under the 
constant threat of terrorism.   
This thesis is about the Thugs and the Sikhs not because both operated on the 
Indian sub-continent.  The modern federal government of India opposed and eventually 
defeated the Sikh terrorists, while the Thugs were eliminated by the British colonial 
government in India many years earlier.  Although even totalitarian regimes can provide 
lessons on how to deal successfully with terrorists, the fact that the governments in both 
 
9 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base 
Glossary,” http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp, accessed 17 July 2005. 
10 Ignatieff notes, “Moreover, most terrorists attacks start from a racially, ethnically, or religiously 
motivated conviction that certain categories of human beings are not worthy of moral standing or 
consideration.  To violate civilian immunity, therefore, is to assume that noble political ends, like the 
struggle against injustice, can justify treating human beings as a means.  This way nihilism lies.  If the 
civilians on the other side are legitimate targets, there is nothing to prevent your targeting your own side if 
they begin to inform on your struggle or resist your exactions.  Once the principle of discriminating 
carefully in the use of violence is abandoned, it can be corrosive of the principles that supposedly guided 
the struggle for freedom in the first place.”  Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 94. 
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of these cases attempted to ensure order using legal systems reasonably comparable to 
those in the United States makes their experiences more relevant. 
In the early 1800s, the British East India Company controlled India with an 
appointed governor-general.  Actual governance was overseen by the British Crown and 
British judges administered Hindu or Islamic law under British legal and judicial 
systems.11  While there were local police in some areas during the anti-Thug campaign, 
the army, comprised mostly of Indian sepoys12 with British officers and few regular 
British regiments, provided the security force used to suppress the Thugs.13  The British 
attempted to instill in India a justice system similar to their own beginning with the 
Regulating Act of 1773, followed by the India Act of 1784 and the Charter Act of 1813.  
The rule of law was the British standard.  This included the right to due process, fair trials 
with the right to counsel and to present witnesses, and the need for probable cause for the 
issuance of warrants.  The similarities between the British justice system in India and the 
system in the United States are not of primary interest here.  Rather, it is because the 
British compromised the values and rights they were espousing that their experience with 
the suppression of the Thugs is relevant to the current situation in the United States.    
In modern India, the government that suppressed the Sikh terrorists is a federal 
republic with an executive branch, a judicial branch, and a bicameral legislature.  It has 
twenty-eight states and seven union territories.  Its legal system is based on English 
common law.14  In structure, the similarity to the United States is apparent and, as with 
the British anti-Thug campaign, the fact that the Indian government found it necessary to 
compromise individual rights in their suppression of the terrorists is significant for the 
United States today.  
  
 
11 George Bruce, The Stranglers: The Cult of Thuggee and Its Overthrow in British India (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 44; Martine van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveler: Colonial 
Imaginings and the Thugs of India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 45-47; U.S. Library of 
Congress, “Company Rule, 1757-1857,” A Country Study – India, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+in0022), accessed 9 September, 2005. 
12 Native Indian soldiers serving under British command. 
13 Peter Marshall, “The British Presence in India in the 18th Century,” History: The British Empire, 
bbc.co.uk (1 May 2001), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/state/empire/east_india_01.shtml, accessed 19 July 
2005. 
14 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “India,” CIA World Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: 
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III. BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT: ANTI-THUG 
CAMPAIGN – 1829 - 1835  
The origin of the Thugs is unclear.  They almost certainly existed in the thirteenth 
century and possibly as early as the seventh century.15  Called Phansigars in much of 
India, the British termed them “Thugs,” from the Hindu word “thags,” meaning 
deceivers, another name given to this group.16  It is estimated that they murdered between 
500,000 and one million people in the last three centuries of their existence alone, a 
figure that far exceeds the number of deaths caused by any modern terrorist group.  The 
group's longevity is a major reason for these high mortality figures.17 
The Thugs were a hereditary group, with knowledge, beliefs, skills and traditions 
passed down from father to son (there is little mention of female Thugs).18  Protected by 
local authorities with whom they shared their plunder, the Thugs spent most of the year 
as model citizens.  They lived peacefully in their communities and never attempted to 
harm those around them.  The fraternity of Thugs had a mutual interest in disposing of 
the plunder from their expeditions, so they seldom left traces of stolen goods.  They never 
committed robbery without committing murder.  The sacrifice to the Hindu goddess Kali 
was crucial.  They made it a point that no one ever escape their attacks; they never left 
witnesses.  Older children of their victims were killed with their parents.  Very young 
boys were usually adopted by one of the Thugs, raised as his own, and eventually 
initiated into the fraternity.  Young girls were often sold into prostitution.19  
Typical groups ranged in size from ten to fifty members, but Thugs frequently 
worked in groups of one hundred or more, with smaller groups merging to deal with a 
large party of travelers.  Their victims were nearly always travelers.  The Thugs would 
appear as normal, inoffensive travelers themselves.  They would fall in with a party of 
 
15 David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” The American 
Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984), 661. 
16 George Bruce, The Stranglers: The Cult of Thuggee and Its Overthrow in British India (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 11-14. 
17 Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling,” 662. 
18 W. G. Tinckom-Fernandez, “Oriental Origin of Thugs,” The New York Times, 18 November 1923, 
SM9; Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling,” 662; Bruce, The Stranglers, 21.  
19 Bruce, The Stranglers, 14. 
10 
                                                
travelers, often under the guise of providing mutual security against thieves and 
murderers by virtue of having greater numbers when the groups combined.  Often, some 
members of the group would run ahead and wait for the others.  They would frequently 
take days to win the confidence and often the friendship of their intended victims.  At a 
chosen time and place, with the choice heavily influenced by omens, the Thugs would 
fall upon the travelers.  At least two Thugs would kill each person, with one Thug 
holding the victim’s hands or legs while another strangled him with a silk handkerchief 
called a “rumal,” generally white or red in honor of Kali.20  At times the death was 
deliberately prolonged for the Kali's enjoyment.21   
This ritualistic killing, known as “thuggee,” generally took place in an isolated 
area, preferably near a sandy place or jungle.  No blood was spilled during the killing.  A 
three or four foot hole was dug with a pickaxe, and the body was mutilated and placed 
face down in the hole.  The body was mutilated so it would fit into the hole, and, more 
importantly, to increase its rate of decomposition. This prevented the build-up of gases 
that would inflate the corpse and, if released suddenly, could attract jackals that would 
dig it up.  Occasionally, the body was simply dumped in a well.  If the victim had a dog, 
it was also killed, to prevent the animal from leading others to its master’s body.22  
The plunder was divided according to strict guidelines:  two shares to the group’s 
leaders, one and one-half shares to those who actually committed the murder and to the 
person who cut the body, and one share to the other members of the gang.  The plunder 
was usually carried home and sold below value, with a certain amount given to the priests 
of Kali.  It was never sold near the murder site or any place where it could be recognized.  
Officials and landowners in the Thugs’ home communities were evidently well paid off 
to ignore these practices.23 
Sons of Thugs were gradually and carefully initiated into thuggee.  Young boys 
were kept away from the Thug expeditions, but when they reached their early to mid-
teens, they began to accompany their fathers.  At first, they were shielded from the actual 
killing.  Apparently, during the first few expeditions, some kind of psychological 
 
20 Bruce, The Stranglers, 53-71. 
21 Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling,” 662. 
22 Bruce, The Stranglers, 13-20. 
23 Bruce, ibid., 19, 63, 82. 
11 
                                                
preparation took place so that the youth would be ready to participate in future killings 
without remorse.  By the third expedition, the youths were made aware of the full 
process.  Their first duty would be as scouts; then they would aid in grave digging and 
body mutilation.  Eventually they would become responsible for holding the victim.  
Those who were candidates to become “bhurtotes,” or stranglers, would seek out an 
older, experienced strangler in the gang and ask him to serve as guru.   It was the guru’s 
responsibility to teach his student the art of the rumal and also to preside over the 
necessary religious rites.24 
Thugs were an unusual mixture of Indian society.  People from all regions, 
classes, and castes were involved.  Individual gangs could be diverse, with both Muslims 
and Hindus working together.25  A rationale for the seemingly incongruous association of 
Muslims with the Hindu goddess Kali can be found in this exchange between the British 
officer Captain William Sleeman and a convicted Muslim Thug:  
“…we never murder unless the omens are favourable [sic]; we consider 
favourable [sic] omens as the mandates of the deity.” 
“What deity?” 
“Bhowanee (Kali).” 
“But Bhowanee, you say, has no influence upon the welfare or otherwise 
of your soul hereafter?” 
“None, we believe; but she influences our fates in this world and what she 
orders in this world, we believe that God will not punish in the next.”26  
Apparently the Muslim Thugs believed that the worship of both the Hindu 
goddess and Allah was permissible, with Kali influencing the here and now and Allah, in 
control of the afterlife, permitting devotion to Kali while on earth.  They either saw no 
conflict between their belief in Islam and following the rituals of Kali, or they were able 
to rationalize the killings (with resultant profits) for their own purposes.  
 
24 Bruce, The Stranglers, 55. 
25 Harry Rosenberg, “Ameer Ali – Thug,” Road to Peace (2003), 
http://www.roadtopeace.org/terrorism/Terrorists/ameer_ali.html , accessed 14 May 2005; Parama Roy, 
Indian Traffic: Identities in Question in Colonial and Postcolonial India (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 45; Tinckom-Fernandez SM9. 
26 Bruce, The Stranglers, 168. 
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Thugs maintained a certain hierarchy within their gangs, but the gangs themselves 
were autonomous, making their own decisions and planning their own operations.  They 
operated without any headquarters, single leader or central command.  The gangs were 
connected by a common secret language, traditions, rituals, and their worship of Kali.    
The gangs could operate independently or join up to attack a larger target.  Swarming, as 
related to modern terrorism, “occurs when the dispersed nodes of a network of small (and 
perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions…Once in 
motion, swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then 
dissever and re-disperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse.”27  This is an 
accurate description of how Thug gangs would cooperate to murder large parties of 
travelers.  Thugs would use runners and their secret language to quickly and quietly 
arrange the combination and cooperation of several gangs.  Once the victims were 
strangled, their bodies disposed of and the plunder divided, the gangs would once again 
fade away into the countryside, becoming as amorphous and ambiguous as any modern 
terrorist organization could hope to be.  Different gangs of Thugs would sometimes act in 
concert to attack large parties of travelers, but the gangs held little loyalty toward other 
Thugs, a trait that the British used against them.   
In the later years of their existence, some Thug gangs apparently became overly 
preoccupied with plunder.  But for the most part, thuggee seemed to be a serious religious 
ritual to the gangs.  Kali was a goddess of terror and destruction, and she demanded 
sacrifice.  A prolonged death was important because the victim’s terror was an offering to 
Kali.  It was forbidden to rob without committing murder first.  Thugs looked down upon 
common thieves, considering themselves as serving a higher purpose.  A gang’s actions 
were restricted by a strict set of rules.28  Gangs would never set out without checking the 
omens through a priest of Kali.29  Omens guided them throughout the expedition.  The 
braying of a donkey, the howling of a wolf, the appearance of a hare, all had significance 
that could change with time and the direction from which the omen presented itself.   The 
pickaxe was considered sacred, symbolic of Kali’s tooth and the sign of the Thugs.  After 
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each killing, there was a ritual with “goor,” a sacred sugar.30  Religion was certainly one 
of the major factors motivating the Thugs, competing with tradition, upbringing, social 
pressure, and possibly the strongest motivation, greed.    
Martha Crenshaw’s organizational process theory includes the basic assumption 
that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.31  This 
could account for the longevity of the Thugs.  The leaders of an organization especially 
have a personal interest in perpetuating the organization; they stand to lose status, and in 
some cases material rewards, by its failure.  An organization’s survival depends on the 
rewards it provides for its members.32  For religious organizations in particular, those 
rewards may be intangible and promised in the afterlife.  The Thugs, however, were able 
to provide both financial and spiritual rewards to their members. 
At times there is a fine line between terrorism for the sake of religious beliefs as 
opposed to political, ethno-nationalist, or, as in the case of the Thugs, criminal agendas.  
While mundane factors almost certainly affect any group and probably influence some 
individuals more than others, the perceived desires of a deity are the real inspiration for a 
religious terrorist organization.  Admittedly, the Thugs did not meet many of the more 
commonly accepted modern definitions of a terrorist organization.  They sought no 
political end or publicity and had no desire to provoke fear in a target population.  In their 
case, the exact opposite was true – it was extremely important to this group that their 
activities remain secret in order to ensure a steady stream of sacrificial lambs. Rapoport, 
however, believes the Thugs were terrorists, and states, 
As persons consciously committing atrocities, acts that go beyond the 
accepted norms and immunities that regulate violence, they were, 
according to one established definition, clearly terrorists.  Their deceit, 
unusual weapon (a noose), and practice of dismembering corpses (thereby 
preventing cremation or proper burial) made Thug violence outrageous by 
Hindu standards, or, for that matter, by those of any other culture.33 
 
30 Bruce, The Stranglers, 64, 135. 
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These arguments aside, the Thugs' motives for enlisting, organization, and 
operations were similar enough to some modern terrorist groups that the strategies and 
tactics used against them are worth examining.   
Consider a comparison of motivations for enlistment between the Thugs and a 
modern terrorist organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a member of the 
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders formed by Osama 
bin Laden in 1998.  Crenshaw lists the following motivations for joining an established 
terrorist organization:  to belong to a group, to acquire social status and reputation, to find 
comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits.  In some cases, the opportunity 
for excitement and action may be an overriding motive.34  Both the Thugs and HUM 
relied on a period of psychological preparation to ensure the recruits were adequately 
indoctrinated; both preferred to bring young men into the organization during their early 
teens; both required a period of training and assessment before the new recruit became a 
full member; both inspired their recruits with the promise of spiritual reward and 
provided for their basic needs.  After completing their apprenticeships, members of both 
groups were paid, and emotional satisfaction and status provided reasons for remaining 
part of the organization.  Both groups also had high initiation costs (murder, other 
criminal acts), which is a strategy used by modern terrorist groups to discourage their 
members from defecting.35 
Comparisons with al Qaeda are also apparent.  Like al Qaeda nodes, each Thug 
gang was privately financed and maintained itself, but depended on outside sympathizers 
for support.  As with any modern terrorist group, the actions of the Thugs were 
determined by their ideology.  Ties between nodes were loose, but because of their 
common religious beliefs and goals, they could be pulled together when needed for an 
operation. The destruction of any node or any single individual would not greatly affect 
the Thugs as a whole.    Religion was the legitimizing factor for both groups as conveyed 
by “holy men” who claimed to speak for their divinity.  Violence is divinely sanctioned, 
in fact demanded by their religion – as they interpret it. 
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Thugs were able to keep the extent of their operations well hidden from the 
British for many years.  The first mention of the Thug problem by the British was an 
1810 notice from major General St. Leger warning sepoys36 going on leave about the 
dangers of traveling the roads with large sums of money.37  An essay by Dr. Richard 
Sherwood in 1816 described the practice of thuggee, but most British officials dismissed 
the idea of an extensive organization of ritual murderers.38  It was not until Sleeman 
began his crusade against the Thugs that such a seemingly absurd idea could be accepted.  
During their rule of India, the English were mostly concerned with commercial 
interests.39  They purposely dissociated themselves from Indian civilization and culture 
and had a policy of non-interference with religion.40  Unless there was a noticeable 
increase in the crime rate, the government did not consider criminal activity by 
individuals to be of major concern.  Collective criminal actions, however, were seen as 
directed against the authority of the state or having the effect of weakening that authority, 
and therefore had to be addressed.41  Thuggee, as the British viewed it, was just such a 
collective criminal activity and its religious basis, while interesting, was insignificant.  
Prior to Sleeman’s efforts, convicting Thugs in local courts was extremely 
difficult.  Physical evidence was almost always lacking.  Bodies and loot vanished 
quickly after a killing.  Muslim criminal law disallowed the testimony of informers, and 
because the Thugs were so ingrained into society and often protected by local officials, 
all charges were generally dismissed.  Hindu law provided similar protection from 
prosecution.  The British dealt with this by disposing of what remained of Muslim and 
Hindu criminal law in these cases.  Over the objections of the judges who regarded legal 
procedures as paramount, they created laws making it a crime, punishable by life in 
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prison, simply to be a Thug.42  It was not necessary to have committed an act of thuggee, 
since being a Thug meant that thuggee was a religious obligation and therefore no Thug 
could be allowed to go free.43  Special courts were formed with special magistrates for 
Thug trials.  It was common practice to arrest the family of a Thug and hold them hostage 
until the Thug turned himself in for prosecution.  Sleeman’s direct superior, Curwen 
Smith, Governor-General’s Agent in the Saugor and Narbada Territories, explained the 
rationale for this practice in a letter to Chief Secretary George Swinton.  “They (Thug’s 
families) [are] usually the only ties by whose misfortunes he can be affected.  Thugs are 
generally hereditary; there could be no injustice therefore in chaining the lion’s whelps 
until the lion himself is disposed of.”44  Some prisoners and their families were placed in 
compounds and forced into manual labor.  Sons of Thugs were not permitted to marry to 
prevent breeding another generation of Thugs.45 Branding of the convicted was common.  
Gang leaders were primary targets and subject to execution when caught.46  Sleeman also 
targeted Thug supporters, including the banks they were using to launder the plunder.    
Sleeman’s major weapon in his war on Thugs was the use of the "approvers."  
Approvers were convicted Thugs who agreed to inform on other known Thugs to avoid 
being hung or exiled. Identification of a Thug by approvers, even if no other evidence 
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was presented made one automatically guilty until proven innocent.  It was not necessary 
to prove that the accused had committed any specific crime. The accused did not have the 
benefit of counsel so approvers were never cross-examined. Appeals were not 
permitted.47  Sleeman realized that since Thug membership was hereditary, by 
identifying Thug families he could pinpoint those individuals most likely engaged in 
thuggee.  Using his approvers, he drew up Thug family trees, which were then given to 
his men so they could hunt down and arrest members of those suspect families. While 
approvers often refused to inform on members of their own gang, they could be pressured 
to inform on other gangs.  By cleverly playing the approvers against each other, Sleeman 
was able to make major inroads into various Thug gangs.  When members of one gang 
were arrested on information from an approver, they could be coerced into giving 
information on other gangs, including that of the original approver.  Eventually, Sleeman 
captured a knowledgeable, high-level Thug, who provided detailed information on 
numerous other gangs. 
The British adoption of repressive laws made it extremely easy to hold and 
convict Thugs, and extremely difficult for those accused to defend themselves.  An 
unusually high percentage of those accused were convicted.  Conviction of the innocent 
apparently did not concern of the British.48  Sleeman’s campaign began feebly in 1826 
and did not gain momentum until the 1830’s.  By October of 1835, 1562 Thugs had been 
tried; 382 were executed, 909 transported for life (exiled), 77 imprisoned for life, 71 
given limited imprisonment, 49 made approvers, 21 released on security, 11 escaped, 31 
died in custody, and 21 were acquitted.49  In the years 1832 and 1833, Curwen Smith 
tried 868 accused Thugs; forty others were tried by other British residents.50  Of these 
908 accused, only two were acquitted.51  Rather than arousing concern, the high 
conviction rate was viewed as a validation of the campaign.52   
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The British disregard of civil liberties was deliberate.  In western nations of the 
nineteenth century, “… law was the social acknowledgment of the power of the 
individual.  Western law was defined by the principles of liberty and protection of human 
life and respect of private property, and it claimed a universal moral dimension.”53  
Those in charge of the anti-Thug campaign readily acknowledged that they were taking 
steps beyond what would ordinarily be considered acceptable.  In arguing for a change in 
the law to allow conviction based on the testimony of approvers, Sleeman wrote,  
…a departure from rules like these, however suitable to ordinary times and 
circumstances, and to a more advanced and rational system of society, 
becomes indispensably necessary; and as they have matured their system 
to deprive all governments of every other kind of direct evidence to their 
guilt but the testimony of their associates, it behoves [sic] all Governments 
(in India) … to mature another by which their testimonies shall be 
rendered effectual for their conviction without endangering the safety of 
the innocent.  This I hope, has now been done.54 
Referring to the many months during which the accused were held awaiting trial, 
Sleeman noted,  
It is no doubt better that ten guilty men should escape the punishment of 
death, and all the eternal consequences which may result from it, than that 
one innocent man should suffer that punishment; but it is not better that 
ten assassins by profession should escape, and be left freely and 
impudently to follow everywhere their murderous trade, than that one 
innocent man should suffer the inconvenience of temporary 
imprisonment.55 
In a letter from Curwen Smith to Swinton defending the use of general warrants, 
which  allowed the arrest of anyone pointed out by an approver even if not specifically 
named on a warrant, Smith stated,  
I am aware that the use of general warrants is disapproved of generally by 
Government and is liable to great abuse, and to lead to serious oppression.  
It must however be recollected, and the fact deserves the highest 
consideration, that the hands of these miscreants are raised against 
mankind, in general, of all descriptions, sparing neither Hindoos [sic] nor 
Musulmans [sic] ….  The liberty of the subject must bend to a temporary 
suspension as the lesser evil of the two, and therefore though the use of 
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spies and general warrants, will doubtless, occasionally create great evils 
and much distress to individuals, it must be submitted to, as the least of the 
evils attending such a depraved state of society, as at present obtains … in 
general throughout the whole continent of India.56 
Defenders of the Thug campaign claimed they ensured justice by requiring 
independent accusations by several approvers, while acknowledging “some petty 
abuses,” such as extortion under the threat of being accused as a Thug, and imprisonment 
of innocent people.57 
Not everyone approved of the new laws. Several British residents opposed the 
campaign on the grounds that it was an unfair process and could subject innocent people 
to punishment.58  Lord Cavendish at Gwalior and Lord Lushington at Bharatpur 
complained of arrests based solely on the denunciations of approvers, as well as British 
interference in the internal affairs of reigning local kings.  In a letter to the Governor 
General, Cavendish protested, “Their [accused Thugs] apprehension, detention and 
confinement, if innocent, must be considered a great evil.  The Gwailor territory has had 
several visits for this purpose since my arrival and having been a magistrate in former 
days I know of the difficulty of preventing extortion and oppression.”59 
 Those in charge of the campaign, however, believed in its efficacy. Curwen 
Smith believed there was little chance of the innocent being punished through “such 
cautious proceedings,” claiming that “their innocence at the trial could hardly fail to be 
made manifest.”60  George Bruce notes the flaw in this system: 
Herein lay the possible defect of the system, for once arrested on the word 
of the approvers and taken to Saugor for trial, for which he could wait in 
grim conditions for months, it would seem that the chances of a suspect's 
release were small indeed.  The system was geared mainly to make 
convictions rather than to examine impartially evidence both for and 
against the accused, according to the accepted axiom that a man is 
innocent until proved guilty.61 
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 By 1836 thuggee had become something of a rarity.  William Sleeman and the 
other figures behind the Thug campaign had achieved their goal of ending this menace, 
even if other dangers arose to take its place.  It was not until the mid-1840s, however, that 
the British felt secure enough to proclaim an end to the practice of thuggee, although it 
appears that ritual killings as a facet of Kali worship, continued in some form into the 
next century. 62 
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IV. INDIA: SIKH COUNTERTERRORISM – 1980S-1990S 
The Punjab is India’s primary agricultural region with a majority Sikh population.  
Sikhs in the rest of India are a minority group in a largely Hindu nation.  For several 
decades Sikhs in the Punjab believed the central government had failed to meet their 
needs, and that the government's failure was due at least in part to religious intolerance.63  
The government under Indira Gandhi appeared particularly unresponsive to the needs of 
the region.  The Akali Dal emerged as the predominant Sikh political party and became 
progressively more uncooperative with Gandhi’s government.  During this time, a 
relatively small separatist movement began in the region, calling for an independent Sikh 
state to be known as Khalistan. Gandhi used her superior access to the media to 
characterize her opponents in the region as dangerous religious fanatics’ intent on 
secession.  In 1980 she declared “President’s Rule” in the region, which dissolved the 
state’s legislative assemblies and required new elections to get a supportive local 
government.64  During 1984 Gandhi and her government again declared “President’s 
Rule” in the Punjab, and sent in four army divisions.65  The state was sealed off with 
approximately 70,000 troops, the state legislature was dissolved, martial law was 
declared, and complete press censorship was established.66  Gandhi’s determination to rid 
the region of opponents was such that, at the time of her assassination, virtually the entire 
Akali Dal leadership was in prison.67  
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale emerged in the late 1970s as a Sikh religious leader 
opposed to various fanatic Hindu organizations.  Many of his followers were young, 
poor, unemployed Sikhs disillusioned with the central government.  Bhindranwale 
fiercely opposed those Sikhs who disagreed with his extremist views.  It was widely 
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rumored that Bhindranwale received indirect support from Indira Gandhi, who hoped to 
fragment the Akali Dal party and create tensions between Sikhs and Hindus so her regime 
could eventually install a cooperative local government.68  The central government and 
newspapers blamed numerous terrorist attacks on Bhindranwale and his followers, 
including dozens (by some estimates, hundreds) of attacks in which terrorists on 
motorcycles would appear suddenly and fire machine guns into crowds.  Bhindranwale 
was arrested in 1982, but released two days later.  In the latter half of 1982, he moved 
into the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar and set up his headquarters.    
By 1984, the Punjab region had experienced at least three years of widespread 
discontent.  Peaceful Sikh protests were punctuated by episodes of violence.  Sikh 
terrorists from various groups attempted to drive a wedge between Sikhs and Hindus, 
undermine the moderate local leadership, and bring power and support to the 
extremists.69  In March of 1984, the Indian government banned the All-India Sikh 
Students Federation, which was believed to be behind much of the terrorist activity at the 
time.  That same month the government charged Akali Dal President Harchand Singh 
Longowal with sedition, thereby driving Sikh moderates closer to the extremist factions 
and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.   
While Bhindranwale’s support grew, he continued to direct terrorist activity from 
the Golden Temple.  Seeing support shift to the extremists, the Akali Dal demanded from 
the Indian government a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the separate religious 
identity of the Sikhs.  Although the government showed some support for this 
amendment, the move was sabotaged by Sikh assassins who murdered several prominent 
Hindu politicians, purportedly on Bhindranwale's orders.70  In response, the Indian 
government declared the Punjab region “deeply disturbed,” and gave the police in Punjab 
the power to enter and search homes without a warrant, to arrest and hold suspects for up 
to six months without establishing a cause, and to imprison without trial for up to two 
years.  The Akali Dal retaliated by calling for a blockade on grain moving out of the 
Punjab to begin on June 3.  The government feared serious economic disruptions and 
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violence.71  Sometime in the late spring of 1984, Bhindranwale and his group moved into 
the Akal Takht, the highest seat of Sikh authority located within the Golden Temple 
complex, an act that was not well-received by much of the Sikh community.72  
By the end of May, it was common knowledge that the government planned to 
attack Bhindranwale’s faction in the Golden Temple.  Bhindranwale fortified the area and 
placed his defenses in the hands of Major General Shahbeg Singh, a former Indian Army 
officer.  Operation Blue Star, as the Indian government operation was named, was 
planned as a commando action, with infantry support and tanks to be used as machine 
gun platforms to neutralize fire on advancing troops and to cover exits.  Armored 
personnel carriers were to keep the complex’s hostel and temple areas separated and 
move troop into areas of heavy fire.73  Blue Star's prime objective was to drive 
Bhindranwale out of the temple complex.  The operation was poorly planned, however, 
beginning with its timing, which coincided with a Sikh holy day that brought large 
crowds to the temple.  The Indian army used artillery both outside and within the Golden 
Temple complex, and numerous civilian casualties resulted.   
When the operation finally ended on the morning of June 6, the bodies of 
Bhindranwale and Major General Shahbeg Singh were found in the Akal Takht.  The 
army also found what it believed was a weapons manufacturing unit.  Survivors inside 
the Golden Temple complex were rounded up; according to Sikh witnesses, many were 
beaten and some executed.  Rumors of mistreatment abounded. The Indian government 
claimed 576 were killed in the operation, including 83 troops.  Sikh estimates went as 
high as 8000 killed (1000 to 1200 are the most commonly cited figures), including many 
unarmed men, women, and children.74  Priceless marble steps were destroyed by tanks, 
the Sikh library at the Temple was destroyed by fire, and numerous buildings were 
severely damaged.  Photographs apparently show Indian Army soldiers defiling the 
Golden Temple by walking around in shoes and leaving their heads uncovered, and some 
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Sikh sources accuse them of drinking alcohol and smoking.75 Forty other Sikh places of 
worship (gurdwaras) were attacked by the Indian Army at the same time as Operation 
Blue Star.76 
Operation Blue Star was intended to put an end to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale 
and his activities but instead increased his popularity.  Many Sikhs suddenly viewed 
Bhindranwale, who had limited support during his lifetime, as a hero and martyr.77  Sikhs 
saw the government’s actions as validating what Bhindranwale had been preaching for 
years:  the Indian government was hostile to the Sikh people.  Always perceived as 
indifferent to the needs of the region, now the central government was thought by many 
Sikhs favor their destruction. 
Politically, Operation Blue Star appeared to prove Indira Gandhi's ruthlessness in 
her attempt to silence opposition.78  The separatist movement became increasingly 
popular among both the Sikhs of the Punjab and the Sikh Diasporas. Sikhs within the 
Indian Army mutinied.79  In October 1984, Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh 
members of her security guard.80  Additionally, the Punjab region faced a leadership 
vacuum, compounding the problems.  The Akali Dal leaders were all in prison and had 
been discredited.  Moderate Sikhs blamed them for allowing Bhindranwale to turn the 
Golden Temple into a fortress, thereby leading to Operation Blue Star; extremists 
condemned them for “surrendering” to Indian authorities.81  The stage was set for a 
decade of disorder in the region. Over the next few years, the fight for an independent 
state of Khalistan grew increasingly violent.  Criminal elements took advantage of the 
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unstable situation and operated within the state under the guise of being insurgents.  
Terrorist activity increased dramatically.  According to K.P.S. Gill, terrorists had killed 
13 civilians in 1981, 13 in 1982, 75 in 1983, and 158 between January and May of 
1984.82  Between 1984 and 1993, more than 13,000 people were killed by violence 
related to the “insurgency.”  More than 60% of these were Sikhs.83     
Numerous terrorist groups were in operation, including the Khalistan Commando 
Force, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force, the 
Babbar Khalsa, the Dashmesh Regiment, the Khalistan Armed Force, the Khalistan 
Guerilla Force, the Khalistan National Army, and the Khalistan Liberation Army.  
According to the Asian Journal on International Terrorism and Conflicts,  
Underground organizations were so strong in Punjab during this phase that 
they were able to frame their own laws. During 1986-87, they brought out 
a list of 13 do’s and don’ts as a part of their ‘social reform movement’ 
aimed at reforming the Sikh masses. This included boycott of tobacco, 
liquor, meat and barber shops. Hundreds of barber shops were burned 
down or forcibly closed during the campaign. A dress code was 
announced for Sikh men, women and school-going children.84   
In deliberate attempts to drive minority Hindus from the region and terrorize local 
Sikhs to comply with their wishes, these groups raped, bombed markets, restaurants, and 
residential areas, gunned down residents of Hindu neighborhoods, and massacred 
passengers on trains and buses (including fellow Sikhs who objected).  They assassinated 
moderate Sikh leaders as well as journalists, civil servants, politicians and businessmen 
who opposed them, and kidnapped civilians for the purpose of extortion, often murdering 
 
82 K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993” in Faultlines 1, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpstext.htm, accessed 12 December 
2004. 





%29%29&Prod_Name=SASS&.  Accessed 10 September 2005.  Other sources place the total number 
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to 1984.  K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab,” Faultlines. 
84 Vipul Mudgal, “Roots of Violence in Indian Punjab,” AAKROSH - Asian Journal on International 
Terrorism and Conflicts 2, no. 3 (April 2001), http://www.stratmag.com/Aakrosh/ac20303.htm, accessed 4 
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the victim afterward.  In 1992, they began targeting the families of police, killing 133 
family members that year, many of whom were children.85    
The Indian government entered the 1990s with inconsistent and ill-conceived 
policies toward the terrorists.  At first, the central government seemed to ignore the 
problem, hoping it would go away on its own.  When it became apparent that this tactic 
would not work, they began negotiating with the militants.  Terrorists, believing their 
tactics were bringing them success, stepped up their operations.  Finally, the Indian 
government reacted with oppressive military tactics, further driving a wedge between the 
central government and Punjab, and enlisting more support for the terrorists.86 
K.P.S. Gill, who received much of the credit for the eventual defeat of the Sikh 
terrorists, described the situation in Punjab in 1986 as follows: 
The violence escalated continuously as both the political and the police 
leadership failed consistently to define an unambiguous response to 
terrorism.  Indeed, there was no concerted and consistent bid to confront 
the problem squarely, no political strategy, and no clarification of the 
principles of administrative, judicial and executive response to the 
scourge.  The police response, to the extent that it was mandated by the 
political executive, was itself muddled.  Dictated by traditional notions of 
use of force in situations of civil strife, the dominant thinking emphasized 
the ‘minimum use of force’ against the unconstrained violence of the 
terrorists.  This thinking persisted among many police officers at the 
senior-most level even after the introduction of the sophisticated 
Kalashnikov assault rifle [the AK-47] into the terrorist armory after May 
1987.  With the supply of Kalashnikovs to the terrorists, Pakistan had 
clearly increased the stakes of its covert war in India, and terrorism, at this 
point, entered a completely new and deadlier phase.87 
Gill took over as Director General of Punjab Police in early 1988 and was placed 
in charge of the counter-terrorism efforts.  He found himself in charge of a force that was 
“deeply divided and demoralized; ill-equipped, organizationally, materially, and 
 
85 K.P.S. Gill, Punjab:  The Knights of Falsehood (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1997), 76, 91-
92, 100; Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir 6, no. 10 
(September 1994), hrw.org, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1994/kashmir94-03.htm , accessed 14 
May 2005; 
86 William Scott Latimer, “What Can the United States Learn from India to Counter Terrorism?” 
(Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004), 19-21. 
87 K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab: 1988-93,” in Terror and Containment: Perspectives of India’s 
Internal Security, ed. K.P.S. Gill (New Delhi: Gyan, 2001), 33. 
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mentally, to confront the larger challenge of eradicating terrorism from the entire state.”88  
He saw a number of key problems that needed addressing before the police could tackle 
the terrorist problem:   
• Inadequate manpower, training, weapons, transport, and communications 
at police stations, preventing them from reacting independently to terrorist 
actions 
• Poor utilization of available police staff 
• Divisions between various police and paramilitary forces resulting from 
cultural biases 
• Infiltration of the police by terrorist sympathizers 
• Inadequate intelligence gathering and analysis 
• Absence of a coherent strategy of response to terrorist activity 
• Lack of leadership 
 Gill reorganized the police, upgraded their weaponry, and changed leadership.  He 
segregated those personnel believed to be compromised and ensured they were not 
assigned to anti-terrorism or other sensitive duties. He selectively upgraded police 
stations and established coordination and cooperation between all forces operating in the 
area. Under his command, intelligence gathering was expanded and “a continuous system 
of documentation and analysis and of dissemination of all received intelligence” was 
established.  Finally, with this rejuvenated intelligence resource, he developed an 
aggressive strategy for dealing with the terrorists.  According to Gill, 
Each major strike by the terrorists was followed up with major counter-
terrorist operations. The responsible group was targeted not only in the 
Punjab, but in their safe-houses all over the country. The detailed 
information available of their possible escape routes – including shelters 
with the extended families of each terrorist, extended families of terrorists 
who had been killed in the past, key sympathisers [sic] and harbourers 








88 K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 33. 
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operations that, even where they did not result in immediate arrest, 
paralysed [sic] individual terrorists and prominent groups, reducing their 
capacity to act in future.89  
Gill’s strategy quickly began to show results. The surveillance and pursuit 
operations made it increasingly difficult for terrorists to operate, and while strikes against 
“soft” targets continued, both the number of civilian deaths and the areas where terrorists 
operated freely decreased noticeably in the following months.90   
The terrorists’ lack of leadership and cohesion, the oppressive laws they forced 
upon the populace, their unpredictable and indiscriminate violence, the increasingly 
visible criminal quality of their operations, and the continually mounting Sikh civilian 
death toll was whittling away at their support.   In March 1989, joint police-paramilitary 
force operations began cordon and search combing operations in villages and farms, 
“yielding a steady stream of arrests and seizures of arms, ammunition and explosives, and 
mounting pressures on the extremists that they found . . . progressively harder to bear.”91  
In mid-1989, a Village Defense Scheme was instituted that armed volunteers in 
vulnerable villages in the region so they could repel terrorist attacks.92  Tactical plans 
were drawn up for each village, bunkers were built, and Special Police Officers were 
appointed and placed in charge of each village operation.93  Like William Sleeman in his 
campaign against the Thugs 150 years earlier, Gill relied on captured terrorists turned 
informants, called “spotters,” to identify terrorists.94  Gill claims that within three 
 
89 Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 44-45.  Gill credits his intelligence operations with 
providing information about the “networks of safe-houses, harbourers [sic] and sympathizers” as well as 
the “jurisdiction, membership, activities, strategies and networks of each of the major gangs operating in 
the state.”  It is assumed that this intelligence also led the government forces to believe that the 
insurgents/terrorists were turning to trusted family members for safety and support.  See Gill “Endgame,” 
in Terror and Containment, 37-46.  
90 Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 37-46. 
91 Gill, ibid., 47-48. 
92 Village Defense Committees formed under such schemes generally reflect the population of the 
region in their ethnic and religious makeup.  Gill refers to forming such a committee in a village of “mixed 
population”; presumably Sikh and Hindu (see K.P.S. Gill, “Dubious Things Called Popular Support”, 
Freedom from Fear, 2001, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/terrorism/dec01pio.htm, accessed 15 May 
2005).  Sikhs make up approximately 60 percent of the population, and the region is not segregated by 
ethnicity.  Therefore it is presumed that the Village Defense Scheme encompassed Sikh, Hindu, and mixed 
villages.   
93 Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 50. 
94 Gill provides no information on the trustworthiness of these informants, and no reference to the use 
of informants could be found in the literature criticizing government counterterrorism operations in Punjab. 
29 
                                                
months, these operations made a substantial impact on a number of prominent terrorist 
groups' ability to hit “soft” targets.95   
The central government developed a sense of direction.  Besides supporting the 
Punjab police, encouraging cooperation between the police and military, and developing 
specialized counterterrorism training programs, all key steps in themselves, the 
government also adopted a non-negotiation strategy with the terrorists.  Once it became 
obvious that the government could not be blackmailed into capitulation, the public 
realized that the violence was counterproductive.96  Elections were scheduled for June 
1991, but escalation of terrorist activity forced their cancellation.  Recognizing the need 
to restore a constitutional government in the state, in November of that year the Indian 
government gave the police and military a mandate to restore order in preparation for 
new elections in February 1992.97  A concerted effort was made to ensure cooperation 
and intelligence sharing between the two forces.  Additionally, it is believed that K.P.S. 
Gill instituted a “catch and kill” 98 policy for suspected militants.99  When elections were 
held in 1992 under the threat from terrorists to kill anyone who participated, there was 
only a 22 percent turnout, but the tide had begun to turn and the elections did go off as 
planned.100  Less than a year later village elections saw an 82 percent turnout.101  
 
95 Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 48. 
96 Latimer, What Can the United States Learn, 26-27. 
97 Gill, “Endgame,” Faultlines. 
98 Catch and kill - suspected terrorists are picked up are shot dead rather than arrested and taken to 
court.  The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, in force at that time, empowered 
the security forces to enter and search any premises, to arrest any person without warrant, to destroy any 
place on the suspicion of being a “terrorist hideout” and to shoot to kill a suspected terrorist with immunity 
from prosecution.  Ram Narayan Kumar, “Human Rights in Punjab: Constitutional Guarantees and 
Institutional Practice,” Committee for Information and Initiative on Punjab, 
http://www.punjabjustice.org/articles/html/IJPS1.htm , accessed 14 May 2005; Gurharpal Singh, “The 
Punjab Crisis Since 1984: A Reassessment” in Subnational Movements in South Asia, ed. Subrata K. Mitra 
and R. Alison Lewis.  (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1996), 113. 
99 Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Dead Silence: The Legacy of Abuses in 
Punjab, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), 11.; Ram Narayan Kumar and Cynthia Mahmood, 
“Disappearances in Punjab and the Impunity of the Indian State - A Report on Current Human Rights 
Efforts,” 1 October 1998, http://www.panthkhalsa.org/humanrights/index.php, accessed 31 May 2005. 
100 Not everyone considered the 1992 elections as a positive event – at least initially.  In “The Punjab 
Crisis Since 1984: A Reassessment,” published in 1996, Gurharpal Singh, using a quote from India Today 
(15 March 1992) notes, “While most of the electorate stayed away, the Congress-I ‘won the battle for the 
state legislature but lost the war for Sikh hearts.’” G. Singh, “The Punjab Crisis,” 115. 
101 “Peace at Last in Punjab,” The Economist (22 May 1993), 45. 
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 Following the 1992 election, the Indian government began reducing the military 
presence in the area, leaving counterterrorism efforts mostly in the hands of the police.  
With terrorist attacks again escalating, and no longer able to rely on a large military 
force, Gill responded by formulating three “strategies.”  The first was “immediate 
identification of the perpetrators of the latest outrage, and the application of the fullest 
force to secure their arrest or elimination.”  The second was to concentrate on the terrorist 
leaders.  Third, he had senior officers oversee operations at night, when the terrorists 
were most likely to strike.  Already reeling from previous government operations, the 
remaining terrorist organizations could not recover from these initiatives.  When offered 
amnesty for surrendering, 537 terrorists turned themselves in during 1992, and another 
379 surrendered in 1993.  By 1994, terrorist activity had virtually ceased.102 
What have not ceased are allegations of serious human rights abuses by the Indian 
government and specifically the Punjab police during this time.103  While the veracity of 
any given claim of abuse may be questioned, the sheer volume of accusations and 
evidence lends credibility to the allegations.104  According to Human Rights Watch/Asia 
and Physicians for Human Rights, most of those killed in the decade of violence were 
executed by police.  Killings by police in staged encounters were so common that 
“encounter killing” became a euphemism for extrajudicial execution.105 
Extrajudicial executions of these suspected militants and sympathizers 
were carried out as part of deliberate policy conceived by senior police 
and civil administration officials and implemented by the Punjab police.  
In their efforts to find and kill the militants, the Punjab police conducted 
massive search operations, frequently arresting persons who may merely 
have lived in an area known to be frequented by militant groups or who 
have belonged to an organization suspected of supporting the militants.  In 
some cases, the police recruited special agents to identify the victims and 
carry out the killings.  Although there was little effort to disguise the 
nature of these executions, police reports generally claimed the victim was 
 
102 Gill, “Endgame,” in Terror and Containment, 77-81. 
103 The emphasis of this paper is on government actions during their fight against terrorism.  In no 
way does this diminish the horrendous crimes against humanity perpetrated by the terrorists.  Sikh terrorists 
were guilty of targeted and indiscriminate murder, rape, torture, extortion, illicit drug activities, smuggling, 
intimidation, theft and numerous other crimes.   
104 While not admitting to all of the specific abuses alleged by human rights organizations, the 
Supreme Court of India acknowledged “that there had been flagrant violations of human rights on a mass 
scale in Punjab.”  Mudgal, “Roots of Violence.” 
105 Human Rights Watch, Dead Silence, 1. 
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killed in an “encounter” or, occasionally, that he committed suicide to 
avoid capture.  In violation of Indian law, the police usually performed 
perfunctory post mortems and cremated the bodies in secret.106 
According to several analysts and human rights organizations, as well as 
numerous pro-Sikh web sites, torture by police was commonplace; family members were 
frequently tortured in order to ascertain suspects' whereabouts.107  Beatings (often on the 
soles of the feet), electric shock, suspension by the feet or hands (sometimes while tied 
behind the back), stretching the legs apart, and crushing the leg muscles with heavy 
wooden rollers were common methods.  Hundreds of Sikh men simply disappeared after 
falling into police custody.  Gill’s Operation Rakshak II, the offensive following the 1992 
elections, had as its goal the elimination, not merely arrest, of the militant Sikh 
leadership.  Gill also offered a bounty to police for killing known militants – a practice 
that encouraged extrajudicial executions and disappearances.108  Additionally, Punjab 
police supported several undercover organizations, essentially armed vigilante groups 
that operated outside the authority of the state.109  While the Indian constitution allows 
for certain restrictions on the press, Human Rights Watch considers the threats, seizures, 
arrests and harassment of the press by government authorities in Punjab to be violations 
of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.110 
The Indian central government provided the legal foundation for much of what 
transpired at police hands.  Beginning in October of 1983 and continuing through May of 
1985, at least eight new laws were passed to deal with the deteriorating situation in the 
Punjab.  These laws gave both the courts and security forces special powers in cases of 
 
106 Human Rights Watch, Dead Silence, 4.  According to Mudgal, Punjab police used several 
vigilante organizations to assist them.  Police denied supporting these organizations until one group killed 
two police officers.  A high-ranking police official subsequently disclosed their activities.  Mudgal, “Roots 
of Violence.” 
107 Amnesty International, Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal; Cyntia Keppley Mahmood, “Terrorism, Myth, and the Power of Ethnographic Praxis, 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30, no. 5, (October 2001), 528. 
108 Human Rights Watch, Dead Silence, 2-4 
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110 Human Rights Watch, Punjab in Crisis (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 167.  As per 
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, India became a party to this 
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terrorism and other forms of public disorder. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
laws effectively disregarded the civil liberties of the Sikh population, particularly in 
regards to fair treatment and the right to a fair trial.111    Besides numerous unwarranted 
arrests, the army and police felt free to harass and torture the Sikh population to gain 
information on purported extremists.112  The National Security Act of 1980 (amended in 
1984 and 1987) authorized detention of suspected terrorists in Punjab for two years 
without trial.  The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act of 1983 
allowed security forces to search premises and arrest people without a warrant and gave 
them the power to shoot to kill a suspected terrorist with immunity from prosecution.113  
More laws were passed as the situation deteriorated. The Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities Act (TADA) of 1987 authorized detention of persons in a “disturbed area” 
based on suspicion alone.  Bail was prohibited to detainees even if not charged after 90 
days, and detainees were presumed guilty until proven innocent.  In ten years (1985 – 
1995) 17,529 TADA cases were registered by police in Punjab but only one person was 
convicted.114  In 1988, the Indian Parliament dissolved the Punjab State Assembly and 
passed the Fifty-ninth Amendment to the Indian Constitution, “authorizing the extension 
of President’s rule beyond one year, and suspending due process guarantees for rights 
relating to life and liberty and to freedom of speech.”115     
Gill reacts strongly to any allegation of human right abuses and calls the activities 
of the organizations that investigated such abuses, “a massive and well coordinated 
campaign by another group of terrorist front-organizations masquerading as human rights 
activists.” 
‘Fact finding committees’ comprising sympathizers or pro-militant 
politicians were set up after each police operation.  At a time when an 
average of over 200 people were being killed in a month by the terrorists, 
these ‘human rights’ activists pretended that every action by the security 
forces was unjustified.  Every terrorist was killed in a ‘false encounter’ 
 
111 Human Rights Watch, Dead Silence, 5-7 
112 Human Rights Watch, Punjab in Crisis, 5-6. 
113 Amnesty International described this as a “license to torture and kill with impunity.”  Amnesty 
International, India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody (London: Amnesty International, 1992), 60. 
114 Joginder Singh, Without Fear or Favour: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Kaveri Books 1998), 
295; Kaur, “A Judicial Blackout.” 
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(there as no such thing as a ‘genuine encounter’ in their lexicon, the words 
‘false’ and ‘encounter’ went together by definition).  Every arrest 
victimized the innocent.  Every action by the security forces was an 
‘excess, an ‘atrocity’.  The countryside was rife with stories of these 
alleged ‘police atrocities’; but in every case, they were ‘known’ to have 
happened in ‘a village nearby,’ to have been witnessed by a person 
invariably other than the narrator; they transpired in an indeterminate area 
of the mind that could not be identified on any map of Punjab, but which 
existed, at once, everywhere and nowhere. … The disruption these tactics 
caused was far greater than anything the terrorists had, or could have, 
achieved in the past.116 
Contrary to Gill's claims, however, Human Rights Watch is able to provide 
names, places, dates and times, and often first -person accounts of torture, abuse, killings 
and disappearances.117  Even if Gill is correct that there is some conspiracy to discredit 
the police and the government, there is enough evidence that security forces went beyond 
the bounds of normal police actions.  
The government of Punjab, in response to the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s 
interest in the disappearances, suspected extrajudicial executions and human rights 
violations in general, agreed in 1998 that human rights abuses during the period of 
conflict could be investigated by the Punjab Human Rights Commission (created in 1997) 
provided that the Indian Protection of Human Rights Act was amended to allow pursuit 
of cases more than a year old.  The government of India refused this on the grounds that 
the amount of litigation would overwhelm the Punjab Human Rights Commission and the 
National Human Rights Commission.118 
For its part, the Indian central government has appeared to brush off claims of 
human rights and civil liberties abuses in Punjab.  In 1994, in the publication Dead 
Silence, Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights wrote,  
Throughout the conflict, the government gave widespread publicity to 
abuses by Sikh militants, and many of the human rights violations 
described in the report stemmed from deliberate efforts to exact 
retribution.  But there is no indication that the government at the state or 
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federal level since then has made any effort to investigate the abuses 
committed by its own agents or to prosecute the perpetrators, even thought 
the identity of the latter is well documented.  On the contrary, the 
deliberate use of torture and execution as counterinsurgency tactics was 
not merely tolerated but actively encouraged by senior government 
officials. … For the most part, the government of India has responded to 
criticism about systematic human rights abuses by the Punjab police not 
by denying the charges, but by countering that the Sikh militants have 
themselves been responsible for abuses.  In fact, senior police and civil 
authorities in the state and in the central government have acknowledged 
that the practice of “encounter” killings and other abuses has been 
widespread, but they have attempted to justify the abuse as the only 
practical means available for fighting terrorism.  To our knowledge, no 
member of the Punjab police has been subject to criminal prosecution in 
any case of torture, murder or disappearance.119 
 The Indian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established under 
the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA) in1993.  The NHRC can investigate alleged 
abuses, but can only make recommendations; it has no enforcement power.  Additionally, 
the PHRA restricts the NHRC from investigating abuses by members of the armed forces 
and, as noted earlier, abuses must have taken place within one year of filing.  In 
December 1996, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the NHRC to investigate alleged 
disappearances in Punjab. Subsequently, however, the Court placed restrictions on the 
NHRC’s investigations, and the NHRC itself limited its investigation to illegal 
cremations at three crematoria in the Amritsar district, disregarding the forced 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions that may have led to the cremations.  After 
four years of debate and investigations, the NHRC agreed to the Punjab government’s 
offer of $2000 compensation to each of eighteen families with no admission of 
wrongdoing or prosecution of officials.  The families rejected the offer and have 
petitioned the NHRC to expand its inquiry.  The commission agreed to expand the 
investigation of illegal cremations only, but will not investigate disappearances.120  As  
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of 2005, the Indian government has yet to satisfactorily investigate or hold hundreds of 
police and security officers accountable for the abuses that took place during the period 
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V. COMMONALITY IN COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES 
This chapter will identify the counterterrorism measures that were common to 
both the Thug and Sikh campaigns.  Many of the measures described in this chapter are 
considered normal counterterrorism tactics.  There is no attempt to evaluate these 
measures as acceptable or unacceptable under present day American social standards.  
Chapter VI will discuss how the actions taken during these campaigns affected human 
rights and civil liberties. 
Although a century and a half separates the Thug campaign from the Sikh 
campaign, they share a number of similar, if not identical, characteristics.  Besides the 
fact that they took place in the same region of the world, one interesting factor these 
cases had in common was that a single individual received most of the credit for the 
successful outcome of each, and that much of the available detail about each operation 
can be traced to the writings of those single individuals.  Whether complimentary or 
critical, virtually all information on the Thug campaign refers to the records of William 
Sleeman.  Similarly, most of the more specific information on the strategy and tactics of 
the Indian security forces battling the terrorists in the Punjab can be traced to the writings 
of K.P.S. Gill. This has not presented a problem since, for the most part, critics and 
supporters do not disagree about the essential steps that were taken.  Rather, the critics 
argue that the steps were unnecessarily draconian. Both Sleeman and Gill are quite 
unapologetic for their actions, believing those actions to be necessary for the greater 
good.  Regardless of whether the British had ulterior motives for the Thug campaign, as 
both Van Woerkens and Roy claim, or whether the Punjab police were guilty of torture 
and murder, both of these operations successfully ended what was essentially a reign of 
terror.122    
The similarities between the Thug and Sikh campaigns can be divided into two 
general categories: legal/judicial and strategic/tactical. 
 
 
122 Martine van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveler: Colonial Imaginings and the Thugs of India 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Parama Roy, Indian Traffic: Identities in Question in 
Colonial and Postcolonial India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).  Both authors propose 
that the British used the Thug problem as an excuse to expand their influence in the region. 
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A. LEGAL/JUDICIAL 
An initial concern prior to the beginning of each operation was the inadequacy of 
the judicial system.  Both Sleeman, in the early stages of the anti-Thug campaign, and   
Gill, when he assumed control of counterterrorism operations in Punjab, complained that 
under the existing laws, judges were releasing Thugs or Sikh terrorists based on lack of 
evidence.123  While their complaints were directed primarily against the judges, in 
actuality it was the legal system that caused the release of the accused.  Regarding pre-
Thug campaign conditions, Bruce writes:  
The judges regarded legal procedure as of supreme importance and were 
united in opposing changes to make it less liable to be rigged.  Sleeman 
later wrote of these legal obstacles:  “For some years we had been trying 
men accused of Thuggee, but they had almost invariably escaped.  It had 
been difficult, to a degree perhaps not readily appreciable by English 
lawyers…to convict men upon clear judicial evidence of acts of 
Thuggee.124   
The British took judicial power over the Thug trials away from the local judges 
and placed it in the hands of special commissioners.125  The Punjab police and Indian 
security forces made full use of various antiterrorism laws and, if the human rights 
organizations are to be believed, at times did not bother with trials at all, dealing with the 
problem by extra-judicial executions.   
Both the British in the 1830s and the Indian government in the 1980s amended 
their laws to allow detention without trial for extended periods.  For the British, there 
were two reasons for these extended detentions. First, it was more efficient to arrest as 
many in a gang as possible before summoning “witnesses” to testify.  Witnesses, of 
course, were the approvers who were busy traveling with the military, pointing out 
Thugs.  Second, it was practical to hold approvers without trial as long as they could be 
of use in the campaign.  In an 1830 report, Curwen Smith acknowledged that “a number 
of persons [had been] confined in different jails under charge of Thuggee, ever since 
 
123 George Bruce, The Stranglers: The Cult of Thuggee and Its Overthrow in British India (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 42; Vipul Mudgal, “Roots of Violence in Indian Punjab,” 
AAKROSH - Asian Journal on International Terrorism and Conflicts 2, no. 3 (April 2001), 
http://www.stratmag.com/Aakrosh/ac20303.htm, accessed 4 January 2005.   
124 Bruce, The Stranglers, 44-45. Sleeman was using the word “escaped” to refer to the acquittal of 
the men in question. 
125 Bruce, ibid., 86. 
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1823 A.D. without having had any regular trial.”126  It was advantageous for the Indian 
government in Punjab to keep accused terrorists out of the judicial system as long as local 
judges lived in fear of terrorist retribution.  Additionally, antiterrorist laws allowed 
security forces to use broad criteria to sweep up suspected terrorists and supporters; those 
unjustly detained could be released after police had time to ponder the evidence. The 
National Security Act (NSA) allowed for administrative detention without due process.  
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) also allowed for detention without 
due process, but specified criminal charges.  At times the laws were used sequentially:  A 
person would be held for two years under the NSA, and then for several more years under 
TADA.127  
Eventually, in both cases, the security forces essentially got what they desired to 
neutralize the terrorists.  While recognizing the potential danger to civil liberties, the 
British authorized the use of spies and general warrants in the Thug campaign.  Anyone 
identified by an approver as a Thug could be arrested based on that denunciation alone.  
As noted earlier, during the time of Sikh terrorist activity, India passed the Armed Forces 
(Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act of 1983, among other laws, which allowed 
security forces to search premises and arrest people without a warrant and gave them the 
power to shoot to kill suspected terrorists with immunity from prosecution.  
B. STRATEGIC/TACTICAL  
An initial step in both campaigns was an attempt to build up the size of the 
security forces.  Sleeman requested dedicated staff and troops from the British governor 
general, but it took several years before he felt his requests were adequately met.  Gill’s 
situation was different.  India had a large military presence in the area to combat 
terrorism, but its methods were erratic, inefficient and not coordinated with local police.  
The local police had been decimated by murders and low morale.  Gill acted quickly to 
rebuild the force, as well as to coordinate efforts.   
In addition, many of the more useful tactics employed by the security forces in 
each of these cases were nearly identical.  For instance, in each case the families of the 
terrorists were used against them.  The British literally held the family of a suspected 
 
126 van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveler, 70. 
127 Human Rights Watch, Punjab in Crisis (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 149, quoting 
Director General of Police Julio Ribeiro. 
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Thug hostage until the Thug turned himself in to authorities.  Even after the Thug was in 
custody, his family could be imprisoned in a compound to prevent his children from re-
infecting society.  Punjab security forces’ targeting of families was less blatant.  
Terrorists’ families were placed under surveillance and were likely subject to some form 
of intimidation.  There are allegations that security forces used physical violence against 
terrorists’ associates and family members to obtain information on the whereabouts of 
suspects.  If the human rights organizations are to be believed, family members were 
tortured in attempts to discover the terrorists’ location.  Similar tactics, with resultant 
similar accusations, were used to pressure the supporters of Sikh terrorists in Punjab.128  
In early nineteenth century India, the British acknowledged, but did not condone, the 
frequent use of torture by police to extract confessions.129  Punjabi police, while 
conducting their search operations, arrested members of organizations believed to be 
supporting the terrorists.130    
Both security forces targeted terrorist leaders.  Thugs operated in numerous 
groups or gangs, so while there was no overall hierarchical Thug organization or leader in 
control, each gang had its own leaders who were singled out by the British through the 
approvers.131  Additionally, the death sentence was mandatory for gang leaders who did 
not become approvers.132  The Punjab security forces faced a similar situation after 
Bindranwale’s death in 1984.  Numerous terrorist organizations operated mostly 
independently, each with it own leadership.  Gill and the Punjab police made special 
efforts to eliminate these leaders.133 
 
128 It is generally acknowledged that much of the Sikh terrorists’ logistical support and training came 
from factions in Pakistan, outside the operational limits of the Punjab police. In his book Strangers of the 
Mist, Sanjay Hazarika observes, “Over the years, the ISI had stirred the Punjab insurrection, arming and 
training Sikh extremists, until a ruthless police official named Kanwar Pal Singh Gill crushed them with an 
iron hand.”  Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New 
Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), 170. 
129 Anupama Rao, “Problems of Violence, States of Terror: Torture in Colonial India,” Interventions 
3 (2001), 191. 
130 Human Rights Watch, Dead Silence, 4. 
131 van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveler, 51. 
132 van Woerkens, ibid., 47.   
133 Ved Marwah, “India”, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, ed. Yonah Alexander 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 327. 
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 Former terrorists turned informers were a key weapon.  Sleeman credits the use 
of approvers with much of the success of the anti-Thug campaign.  In fact, the testimony 
of the approvers was often the only evidence on which accused Thugs were convicted.  
While Gill does not give his spotters as much credit, he does acknowledge their 
contribution to the security forces’ intelligence gathering and the success of numerous 
operations.134  
The allegations of torture and abuse during counterterrorism efforts in the Punjab 
have been previously noted.  Stories and depositions from arrested Thugs during that 
campaign also indicate that violence was sometimes used freely.  The 1835 deposition of 
arrested Thug Sahib Khan of Kabrin tells how his brother committed suicide by jumping 
down a well to escape the beatings administered by the security forces interrogating 
him.135   
Paid vigilantes or bounty hunters were used to assist security forces in 
apprehending or killing accused terrorists.  Bounty hunters who distinguished themselves 
might also receive additional rewards, and in special cases honorary distinctions and 
titles.136  Punjab police quietly used several undercover organizations to assist them.137  
Initially, the police either denied their existence or claimed they were independent 
vigilante groups operating without their permission.  When Dalbir Singh, a former 
employee of the state police and the leader of one of the organizations, killed two senior 
police officers, a police inspector general blew the whistle on the collaboration between 
the police and the vigilantes.138  Security forces or informers were offered bounties.  The 
British offered rewards to their approvers; Punjab police paid police officers a bounty for 
capturing or killing terrorists.  
 
 
134 K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab,” in Terror and Containment Perspectives of India’s Internal 
Security, ed. K.P.S. Gill (New Delhi: Gyan, 2001), 44-48. 
135 Edward Thornton, Illustrations of the History and Practices of the Thugs (London:  W.H. Allen 
and Co., 1837), 248. 
136 van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveler, 50-51. 
137 Garharpal Singh notes the “employment of irregular hit squads intended to infiltrate and liquidate 
terrorist groups.”  Gurharpal Singh, “The Punjab Crisis Since 1984: A Reassessment” in Subnational 
Movements in South Asia, ed. Subrata K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis.  (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview 
Press, 1996), 113. 
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VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
There are a number of lessons from the history of the Thug and Sikh terrorist 
campaigns that should interest to the United States and other liberal democracies.  One 
example is the successful targeting of leaders in groups that lack a unified hierarchical 
command structure.  The use of informants, a tactic popular for many years with law 
enforcement against street gangs and organized crime, is another example of a method 
that can be (and presumably is) applied against al Qaeda and other groups,.  The focus 
here, however, is on civil liberties and what the United States can expect in that regard, 
considering the history of these two terrorist groups. 
Targeted curtailment of civil liberties was important to both the Thug and Sikh 
campaigns.  The Thug campaign was different from the norm in that changes in the law 
were not instituted immediately following one particular attack or series of attacks.  The 
legal changes came quickly on the heels of official recognition of the threat. This 
distinction makes sense considering the Thugs’ commitment to anonymity and secrecy in 
their operations.  Once the British became fully aware of the extent of the Thug 
operations and realized the threat they posed to safe travel in India, the curtailment of 
civil liberties quickly followed, as it generally does when states feel threatened.139  In 
this particular case, the changes to the law and judicial system were apparently quite 
successful.  In Sleeman's view, the success of the Thug campaign can be credited largely 
to the modifications to the judicial system, second only to the use of informers.   As noted 
previously, in India during the period of the Sikh terrorists, numerous antiterrorism laws 
were passed in response to the terrorist activities of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his 
extremist successors.  In this case, the curtailment of civil liberties was only one factor in 
the success of the Punjab security forces, albeit an important one.  As Vipul Mudgal 
 
139 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 71-81, 108; 
Laura K. Donohue, “Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-05, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP- 2000-01, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, August 2000, 1-5. 
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notes, “Many analysts believe that the Indian state’s victory over terrorism [in] Punjab 
would not have been a reality without ‘unconventional’ methods.”140   
Beyond the curtailment of civil liberties during the Sikh terrorism period, Indian 
security officials' alleged abuses of human rights present a different issue.  First, there is 
question about how much torture and how many extra-judicial executions took place, if 
any.  Like the death toll at the Golden Temple during Operation Blue Star, where one 
group claims fatalities in the hundreds and the other, fatalities in the thousands, the truth 
probably lies somewhere between the human rights groups' allegations and the 
government's denials.  With terrorists deliberately targeting the families of police officers 
and court officials, who consequently lived in fear and inconsistently sentenced or 
released suspects, it would be surprising if no executions took place, as the very survival 
of the police and their families may have depended upon neutralizing their adversaries.  
And while most sources consider human rights to be generally inviolate, there are often 
exceptions141.  Ignatieff notes that even suspects under detention, although disarmed and 
physically restrained, may pose a grievous danger to a large number of citizens based on 
their knowledge of future planned attacks.  Such circumstances have compelled many 
democracies to commit torture for the sake of their people's security and safety.142 Civil 
liberties advocate Alan Dershowitz has stated,  
The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such non-lethal torture 
seems overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict non-lethal pain on one 
guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to prevent 
an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent victims to 
die.  Pain is a lesser and more remediable harm than death; and the lives of 
a thousand innocent people should be valued more than the bodily 
integrity of one guilty person.143 
 
140 Vipul Mudgal, “Roots of Violence in Indian Punjab,” AAKROSH - Asian Journal on International 
Terrorism and Conflicts 2, no. 3 (April 2001), http://www.stratmag.com/Aakrosh/ac20303.htm, accessed 4 
January 2005. 
141 Article 2 of The United Nations Convention Against Torture states, “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”  Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm, accessed 10 July 2005. 
142 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 138.   
143 Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 143-144. 
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However, those like Dershowitz and Ignatieff, who acknowledge that when there 
is a conflict with human rights, the balance tips toward public safety and security, also 
advocate transparency and accountability if such steps are taken.144  And Ignatieff notes,  
Torture might break apart a network of terrorist cells, but it would also 
engender  hatred and resentment among the survivors of the torture 
and further increase their  support among disaffected populations. … 
Extreme measures, like torture,  preventive detention, and arbitrary 
arrest, typically win the battle but lose the  larger war.145  
Indeed, criticizing the Indian government’s methods and fearing the future, 
Gurharpal Singh in 1996 wrote, “…the elimination of Sikh militants has neither 
‘pacified’ Punjab nor ensured that the Punjab problem will be adequately dealt with in the 
medium term.”146  As evidenced by the number of documents and web sites alleging state 
abuses both during this period and after, resentment caused by these practices still runs 
high.   
However, as well-known Indian author and political commentator Arun Shourie 
notes,  
No judge, no human rights organization that today gives lectures about the 
conduct of the Police in Punjab had set out how the Police was to 
prosecute the war when the entire judicial system had literally evaporated: 
magistrates were in mortal dread of terrorists, witnesses – even those who 
had seen those dearest to them being gunned down in front of their eyes – 
would not testify, they could not come forth to give witness without 
risking their lives.147 
Contrary to the predictions of the early critics and the warnings of most analysts, 
the Indian government has restored relative normalcy to the area, just as the British 
created safe travel and trade conditions in the 1800s by using similar tactics to eliminate 
the Thugs.  In neither case was the terrorist activity completely or immediately 
eliminated; Sikh terrorists’ attacks have continued into this century but are very rare, and 
 
144 Peter J. Pham, “Law, Human Rights, Realism and the ‘War on Terror,’” Human Rights and 
Human Welfare, 4 (2004), 100. 
145 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 20. 
146 Gurharpal Singh, “The Punjab Crisis Since 1984: A Reassessment,” in Subnational Movements in 
South Asia, ed. Subrata K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis.  (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 116. 
147 Arun Shourie, “Responding to Terrorism”, in The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material 
and Political Linkages, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: Bulwark Books, 2002), 19. 
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some form of Kali-inspired human sacrifice is thought to have continued for decades 
after the British claimed success against the Thugs.148  Yet peaceful conditions did return 
to these areas following state actions.  This is not to suggest that indefinite detention 
without charges, targeted executions, and torture should be considered the sole causes of 
either group's demise.  The cunning use of informants, the ability to convict based solely 
on the testimony of these same informants, and the general population's lack of support 
for the Thugs was also key factors in their defeat.  The primary factors in the defeat of the 
Sikh terrorists were social, political and economic development, efforts to close religious 
and ethnic divisions, well-equipped and disciplined urban counterterrorism actions, and 
control over counterterrorism efforts by local security forces rather than the military.149  
However, repressive tactics were used to some extent in both cases, and they contributed 
to the success of the counterterrorism efforts.   
Not every terrorist attack evokes a response from the state to the extent that laws 
are changed and special tactics used by security forces.  In cases of isolated attacks, 
frequently the state response is to allow law enforcement to handle the situation as it 
would a normal crime.  But when the state believes itself to be fundamentally threatened 
by the terrorists, or the terrorists have managed to create an atmosphere of fear in the 
public, one can expect the state to take special steps.  In both cases examined in this 
thesis, the governments in question felt threatened.  The colonial British realized that 
trade and the expansion of their influence and control were seriously threatened by the 
gangs of murderers operating freely along the roads of India.  The Thugs were a potential 
menace to all Indian travelers and commerce.  Only by ridding the country of such 
criminals could the British create the type of colony they envisioned.  During the period 
of Sikh terrorism, the state of Punjab had deteriorated into near chaos.  Sikhs as well as 
Hindus were victimized by numerous terrorist groups, some little more than organized 
gangs of common criminals operating under the guise of insurgents.  Drastic action was 
needed to restore the region to some semblance of normalcy.   
 
148 Rahul Bedi, “Trouble in Punjab,” Jane’s Intelligence Review – Asia 7, no. 11 (1 November 1995); 
William Scott Latimer, “What Can the United States Learn from India to Counter Terrorism?” (Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004), 27; P.W. Wilson, “India at the Crossroads,” a review of The 
Making of Modern India by Nicol MacNicol, in The New York Times, 8 February 1925, BR1.; Louise 
Maunsell-Field, “Cults of India,” a review of The Religions and Hidden Cults of India by Lieutenant 
General Sir George MacMunn, in The New York Times, 5 June 1932, BR20.. 
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The conflict between security and civil liberties has existed for as long as 
civilization.  Early nomads traded their free existence for the security of agriculture and 
eventually cities.  According to Gibbon, the imperial Romans believed, “The urgent 
consideration of the public safety may undoubtedly authorize the violation of every 
positive law.”150  In The Lesser Evil, Michael Ignatieff maintains that,  
necessity may require us to take actions in defense of democracy which 
will stray from democracy’s own foundational commitments to dignity.  
While we cannot avoid this, the best way to minimize harms is to maintain 
a clear distinction in our minds between what necessity can justify and 
what the morality of dignity can justify, and never to allow the 
justifications of necessity – risk, threat, imminent danger – to dissolve the 
morally problematic character of necessary measures.151  
Ignatieff’s position takes the middle ground between the pragmatic view that 
rights exist to protect the citizen and therefore liberties “depend on the survival of 
government and must be subordinate to its preservation,” and the moral view that rights 
exist to express the intrinsic worth and dignity of individuals, and such worth and dignity 
is not situational.152  While acknowledging that liberal democracies may have to take 
actions considered objectionable under normal circumstances, he lists four conditions 
necessary before such steps are taken.  
So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness 
that evil is involved.  Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of 
necessity.  Third, we should chose evil means only as a last resort, having 
tried everything else.  Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: we 
must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their 
judgment as to their correctness.153 
Ignatieff’s preconditions are important, but probably not applicable in a practical 
sense immediately after a terrorist attack.  Historically, as evidenced by the two cases 
described here, when a state is threatened by terrorists, or the citizens become fearful due 
to terrorist attacks, civil liberties will be curtailed.  This curtailment, generated after a 
perfunctory examination and debate, can be expected to occur following successful 
 
150 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), 2.26. 
151 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 8. 
152 Ignatieff, ibid., 4-5. 
153 Ignatieff, ibid., 19. 
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terrorist attacks.  It is almost a reflex reaction to events by the government. Eventually, a 
time comes when the state can pause and review the procedures that have been 
implemented and how laws have been amended.  At that point the state can decide if 
those conditions as listed have been met and take steps to ensure the state's actions 
appropriately reflect the state's standards. To refrain from curtailing civil liberties, 
however, would indicate a level of composure and discipline that is not historically 
evident.  In addition to the two cases cited here, Spain, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and 
Canada have all curtailed civil liberties when those states felt threatened.154  Just one 
week after the July 7, 2005 terrorist bombings in London, the British government 
announced plans for legislation that, while not equivalent to indefinite detention, would 
abridge freedom of speech.155 
The reasons for this consistent if somewhat knee-jerk reaction are varied.  First, 
measures such as holding suspects for indefinite periods without trial appear to work, at 
least initially.  This particular measure has been used repeatedly by states combating 
terrorism.  Often, what would be required as evidence of guilt is not readily available, yet 
security forces may be confident that certain persons are dangerous.  Taking these 
persons into custody along with known or suspected associates is believed to safeguard 
the state from attack.  That innocent parties are frequently detained along with terrorists 
is considered an unfortunate but unavoidable side effect.  In “Civil Liberties, Terrorism, 
and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United Kingdom,” Laura K. Donohue notes 
how, each time a new law was passed curtailing civil liberties in response to terrorist  
 
 
154 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 71-81, 108; Donohue, “Civil Liberties.” 
155 Times Online, 15 July 2005 reports: “She [Home Office minister Hazel Blears] also confirmed 
plans to introduce a new offence of ‘acts preparatory to terrorism’ and another to criminalize those inciting 
terrorism indirectly. … Today Ms Blears confirmed that the offence of indirect incitement to commit 
terrorism would have a wide-ranging effect, applying to both public and private statements.  ‘It would 
apply where people would seek to glorify terrorist activity, perhaps, for example, it’s saying “it’s a 
marvellous [sic] thing that this has happened, these people are martyrs.”  Not a direct incitement to go out 
and do so but it could be construed by people hearing that as an endorsement of terrorism…. In some cases 
the tone of your endorsement might take it into glorification.’“  Jenny Booth, “Blears Outlines Tough New 
Anti-terror Laws”, Times Online, 15 July 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-
1695682,00.html, accessed 17 July 2005. 
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activity associated with Northern Ireland, such activity decreased dramatically.156  She 
credits much of the reduction in violence to information obtained from persons who had 
been detained.  Although fewer than 15 percent of the 27,000 arrested between 1974 and 
1996 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act were actually charged with a crime, some of 
those detained provided information that could not have been obtained without the 
antiterrorism laws that permitted such detentions.157 
For political and appointed leaders, amending current laws to allow fewer 
restrictions on security forces at the expense of the rights of the people or a select group 
of people performs two functions.  First, it is a bold statement that can be made 
immediately, showing their decisiveness and intolerance of terrorist activities.  Second, it 
is the political safe-road.  As Ignatieff notes, 
One reason why we balance threat and response poorly is that the political 
costs of under reaction are always going to be higher than the costs of 
overreaction.  Political leaders who fail to take adequate precautions after 
an initial attack will pay heavily after a second one, while those who pile 
on additional measures and still fail to deter the next attack may be able to 
survive by claiming that they did the best they could.  Since no one can 
know in advance what strategy is best calibrated to deter an attack, the 
political leader who hits hard – with security roundups and preventive 
detentions – is making a safer bet, in relation to his own political future, 
than one who adopts the precautionary strategy of “first do no harm.”158 
Yet another reason for states to curtail civil liberties, as Ignatieff notes, is that in 
democratic societies, after a terrorist attack citizens often feel that the openness and 
freedoms of their society have been abused.  They begin to view some of the institutional 
freedoms that make that society what it is as weaknesses, unsuitable for dangerous times.  
This is part of the damage done by terrorists – causing a people to see their freedoms as a 
 
156 “Declining levels of violence in Northern Ireland and Great Britain immediately followed the 
introduction of the 1922 SPA, 1973 EPA, 1939 PVA and 1974 PTA. In Northern Ireland a high of 80 
murders and 58 attempted murders in April 1922 plummeted to one murder and 11 attempted murders by 
September of that year. These figures continued to fall throughout the balance of 1922 and into 1923.  
Similarly, immediately following the introduction of the 1973 EPA, the number of deaths and injuries in 
the Province decreased: from a high of 467 deaths in 1972 to 250 in 1973 and 216 in 1974. Injuries also 
dropped: from 4,876 in 1972 to 2,651 in 1973 and 2,398 in 1974.  As already noted, within a year of the 
introduction of the 1939 PVA the IRA’s mainland campaign had ceased. When violence rose again in the 
1970s in Great Britain, immediately following the introduction of the 1974 PTA a similar drop in the 
number of deaths related to political violence ensued.”  Donohue, “Civil Liberties,” 6-7.  
157 Donohue, “Civil Liberties,” 7 
158 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 58. 
50 
                                                
weakness rather than a strength.  Curtailing the civil liberties of a minority often results.  
The majority is unlikely to feel the effects of this, and often mistakenly believe that the 
affected minority, if they are not terrorists, have nothing to fear.  "[M]ost citizens are 
interested simply in stopping terror in its tracks.  Hence, a majority of citizens is likely to 
believe that risk trumps rights, while only a civil libertarian minority is ever likely to 
believe that rights should trump risks.”159 
Curtailment of civil liberties is also closely related to a second guaranteed result 
of successful terrorist attacks – fear.  A climate of fear within the citizenry will provide a 
major impetus for curtailment of civil liberties.  When a society is threatened, a hierarchy 
of rights begins to emerge and those rights and liberties deemed most important must be 
defended while those considered less essential are subject to abridgement.160  Donohue 
argues that antiterrorism legislation in Britain did not establish the right to life and 
property as the most important rights of the citizen.  Since loss of life or property damage 
are much more likely to occur from traffic accidents and other events than they are from 
terrorist attack, and since there was no proposal to suspend rights with anti-accident 
legislation, in effect the antiterrorism legislation “established that the most important 
right that a citizen bore was the right not to be afraid [of terrorist attack].”161  Donohue 
notes, “The right not to be afraid deserves particular attention here in the possible 
introduction and operation of emergency legislation in other states, because it is this 
entitlement that justified the suspension of 'lesser' rights and the retention of emergency 
law.”162 
Understanding the causes of the curtailment of civil liberties following terrorist 
attacks can help mitigate some of the effects of those actions.  Abridgement of civil 
liberties is potentially damaging to a democratic society, and while Ignatieff states that 
“robust measures do not prevent rights’ returning in times of safety,” Donohue notes that 
emergency antiterrorist legislation can become entrenched in a nation, with few willing to 
advocate its repeal.163  Therefore, the government of the United States must approach 
 
159 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 58-59. 
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antiterrorist legislation following a terrorist attack with an awareness of the history of 
such events.  Debate over the potential harm or benefit of curtailing civil liberties is 
important, but will not likely change the fact that, in the wake of a successful terrorist 
attack, civil liberties will be curtailed.  Knowing this, the state must factor in the 
accountability and transparency that Dershowitz calls for in his advocacy of extreme 
measures, and “sunsets” - preferably time limits of no more than two years - must be 
included in any legislation.  This will allow a period to examine the results of the 
legislation and continue the debate without the heightened emotion that exists 
immediately following an attack.  It may be that the laws curtailing civil liberties have 
been efficacious and should be extended, as now appears likely for much of the USA. 
Patriot Act or that even further restriction is deemed necessary.  On the other hand, if it is 
apparent that society and personal dignity are being damaged unnecessarily, the 
legislation or parts of it can be allowed to “sunset.”  Knowing that abridgement of civil 
liberties can be expected to follow closely on a successful terrorist attack is the first step 
in ensuring that such actions are warranted, effective, and do not transgress more than 
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